Le Banquet, n°21, 2004/2.
Domaine international - thème États-Unis.
Par Simon Chesterman · Heiko Nitzschke

US President George W. Bush didn't need the United Nations going into Iraq, but he needed the UN to get out. This newfound enthusiasm for the UN puts the organization in an extremely difficult situation: the only thing worse than the world's most powerful country shoving you aside as irrelevant is when that country hugs you close and calls you the solution to all its problems.

The relationship between the United States and the United Nations system has always been ambiguous. This reflects in part an historical concern with “foreign entanglements” that runs through US history. US President Woodrow Wilson was one of the driving forces behind the League of Nations, but isolationist forces at home meant that his country never joined that organization. These forces did not prevent the United States taking a lead role in establishing and joining the United Nations, but the United States has been an unreliable partner for the UN throughout its existence. US administrations have tended to take a functionalist approach to the United Nations, viewing the UN as a useful forum for foreign policy only when it serves US national interests. This is sometimes contrasted with a “European” approach, which embraces multilateralism for its own sake.

But the current ambivalence concerning the UN is also a function of the unusual geostrategic moment confronting the twenty-first century. For the most powerful country on the planet, which spends as much on its defence as the next 20 countries combined, is also the most frightened.

The diplomatic fallout in the context of the 2003 Iraq war has certainly been the harshest test in US-UN relations to date. Many have predicted lasting damage to the UN system as the core of the multilateral system of peace and security. Seen in a longer-term context, however, this episode in US-UN relations can be seen as another — albeit extreme — case of that historic reticence to submit to foreign entanglements.

What does lend the Iraq crisis a special importance is that it has led both the United States and the United Nations to redefine their roles in the post-Cold War and post-September 11 era. For the United States, this is sometimes characterized as an “imperial moment” as it begins to use the unprecedented military power that it wields as the sole remaining superpower, or “hyperpower”. For the United Nations, the Iraq crisis prompted the Secretary-General to create a High Level Panel tasked with reassessing the possibility of collective responses to threats when some states feel uniquely vulnerable and have the capacity to respond unilaterally.

Whether the UN can negotiate the treacherous path between irrelevance to and complicity in US foreign policy will determine much of twenty-first century history.

From “assertive multilateralism” to “multilateralism à la carte”

“The United Nations is presently at the crossroads of its development as an international institution. … [E]ven as the United Nations faces an uncertain future of almost-crisis proportion, its chances for viability are threatened by a declining interest and support on the part of the United States. Indeed, there is a great danger that the United States could be responsible for the unravelling of the UN unless we recommit ourselves to strengthening the institution.”

This statement, while reminiscent of today's strained relationship between the United States and the United Nations, was made by two US senators in 1973. Crises of relevance are not new to the United Nations; neither is inconsistent support from its most powerful member.

The end of the Cold War, and with it the superpower confrontation that had hamstrung the collective security arrangements put in place after the Second World War, opened up new opportunities for the UN. Perhaps the highpoint was the administration of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993). Himself US ambassador to the UN in the 1970s, Bush père understood the importance of going to the UN when reversing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 — a clear breach of the UN Charter. Enthused by Security Council support for Operation Desert Storm, Bush proclaimed the advent of a “new world order” in which the UN could finally fulfil its long-promised role as the guardian of international peace and security and “the rule of law would supplant the rule of the jungle.” Heady rhetoric saw a Security Council summit at the level of heads of state assert an expansive mandate for the Council in maintaining peace and security. Yet national interests were not supplanted by reliance on multilateralism. Even in the case of the first Iraq War, Bush himself now admits that “[I]f at any point it became clear we could not succeed, we would back away from a UN mandate and cobble together an independent multinational effort built on friendly Arab and allied participation.”

The advent of the Clinton presidency saw a time of great euphoria in which the UN was seen as a cooperative framework and legitimating organization that would enable the US to pursue its national interests and promote American values. Despite lofty talk of “assertive multilateralism,” however, the Clinton Administration soon proved to be volatile and unreliable patrons and allies for the United Nations. Clinton's presidency saw important innovations, such as the creation of ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, championed by Clinton's UN Ambassador, Madeleine Albright. Yet it also saw some of the most severe crises in the UN system in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

It was also during the Clinton Administration that the issue of Iraq produced important rifts within the Security Council. These rifts concerned the humanitarian consequences of sanctions, Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction programmes, and the “no-fly zones” imposed and militarily enforced by the US and Britain (with temporary support from France).

In light of the diplomatic strains of the recent years and the apparent unilateral tendencies of the present US Administration, one is tempted to view the 1990s as the golden decade in US-UN relations. One would be wrong to do so.

First, the expansion of the UN's role and mandates during this “unnatural decade” was possible only because the US allowed the UN to play this larger role. With the notable exception of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1990s were characterized by a significant divergence of US priorities and those areas in which the UN played a major role. US strategic interests lay in North Korea and China, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East; priority issues of concern were the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and, increasingly, international terrorism, as evidenced by the fact that President Clinton's 1998 speech to the UN was solely on that issue. The UN Security Council, by contrast, was concerned predominantly with humanitarian emergencies and civil wars in Africa, the Balkans, and East Timor; it also tackled such normative issues as the protection of civilians and standards for humanitarian interventions. The events of September 11, 2001, led to a rapid convergence of US and UN priorities with uneasy consequences for both.

Second, belief in a “golden decade” misunderstands the Faustian nature of the bargain that was struck between the US and the UN. The quest for a UN seal of legitimacy was an important foreign policy consideration during many military adventures during the 1990s, but that legitimacy at times seemed no less precious to the United Nations than to the state seeking the authorization. In fact, the United States demonstrated repeatedly that it was prepared, more than any other major power, to stand virtually alone in an international forum if its interests, principles, or domestic politics required it to do so. In the 1991 Gulf War and many other endeavours, going through the United Nations was important to the United States at least as much in terms of burden-sharing as it was in terms of normative authority.

The advent of the administration of President George W. Bush was, however, did see a significant shift in US-UN relations. Taking office in January 2001, Bush proclaimed a “humble” foreign policy and an aversion to “nation-building” projects of its predecessors. In the first months, the Bush Administration's followed a “multilateralism à la carte” approach to foreign policy: it rejected the Kyoto Protocol, withdrew its signature from the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and actively undermined a convention to ban small arms.

Selective multilateralism was not new, but it was accompanied by a significant ideological shift in the way that multilateralism in general and the United Nations in particular were viewed by the new administration. Prior occupants of the White House had tended to be pragmatic in their dealings with the UN — an approach characterized in the present State Department under Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage. But a more fundamental and ideologically-grounded distrust of the UN was espoused by a small group of policy-makers now referred to as “neo-conservatives” or “neo-cons.” This influential group, including Vice-President Dick Cheney, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and former Chairman of the Defense Advisory Board Richard Perle, viewed the United Nations as fundamentally constraining US interests and objectives. These intra-administration differences between the State Department and the Pentagon also determined to a large degree the US-UN relationship with regards the Iraq crisis, discussed below.

The events of September 11, 2001, changed the entire equation. Importantly, the US received strong and unequivocal support from the UN system. A resolution condemning the attacks was swiftly adopted, effectively endorsing the US war in response as legitimate self-defence. This was followed by resolution 1373 (2001), which established a Counter-Terrorism Committee and obliged all governments to cut-off funding and safe-havens to terrorists. An administration that had been uncertain about the merits of the UN now heartily embraced multilateralism in pursuing what was soon called the “war on terror.”

But this coincidence of interests was brief. The September 11 attacks hardened the Bush Administration's Manichean view of foreign relations, dividing the world in to compliant partners and recalcitrant others. Unilateralist impulses prevailed when Washington declined the option of a Security Council resolution authorizing US military action against Afghanistan (which the Council was willing to give). In order to retain as much freedom of military and political action as possible, the Bush Administration instead argued that use of force was justified as an act of self-defence under a broad reading of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Meanwhile, sympathy for the United States on the part of other countries — even its historic allies — was swiftly evaporating. Wariness of US unilateralism seemed confirmed with the publication of a doctrine of pre-emption, enshrined in the 2002 US National Security Strategy. This doctrine stated that the United States “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively.” Together with the stated policy of dissuading potential adversaries from hoping to equal the power of the United States, the strategy document implicitly asserted a unique status for the United States as existing outside of international law as it applies to other states. It soon became clear that the multilateral route chosen by the Bush Administration with regards to the “war on terrorism” did not apply to other areas of US foreign policy. In December 2001, for example, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, and the Bush Administration continued to undermine the ICC by seeking bilateral treaties with several states to avoid the possible extradition of US citizens to the ICC. In the event that a member of the US military was somehow extradited to the Netherlands, legislation provided for an armed attack to “rescue” that person.

As the US began pressuring allies to support its policy of regime change in Iraq, wariness soon gave rise to outright hostility.

The Iraq Crisis 2003-2004

Throughout its existence, the UN has faced many crises that led some to question its continued relevance. Paralyzing tensions over Bosnia in 1992-95, the shameful withdrawal from Somalia from October 1993, inaction in the face of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and the divisions over Kosovo in 1999 were, to some pundits, as life-threatening for the organization as the impasse on the Iraq file in early 2003. But the divisions over Iraq were not confined to the UN Security Council. Instead, they ran through NATO also, and drove a stake through the heart of any idea of a common foreign and security policy framework within the European Union.

The dynamics that characterized the run-up and aftermath of the Iraq crisis in the UN can be regarded as “dual containment”: even as the Security Council attempted to contain the regime of Saddam Hussein as a threat to international peace and security, individual members sought to use the Council contain the United States. This strategy was doomed to failure from the outset, with the unanimous Council resolution in November 2002 merely setting in place a train wreck that ultimately collided in March 2003 with the commencement of hostilities in Iraq.

The course of the war and its aftermath saw three distinct phases in the complex US-UN relationship, discussed here in turn.

Dual Containment

A group of influential “hawks” inside and outside the Bush Administration, led by the neo-cons and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, began to press the issue of regime change in Baghdad shortly after the 11 September attacks. As members of the “Project for a New American Century” a conservative think tank in Washington, DC, the neo-cons had already exerted pressure on the Clinton Administration as early as 1998 to rid Iraq of the Saddam regime — if necessary through military force. Only one day after civilian airplanes hit the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the hawks within the Bush Administration argued during a meeting of the National Security Council that the United States should take advantage of the situation and place Iraq on top of the target list in its just announced “war on terror”. Wolfowitz and others argued that Iraq, not Afghanistan, posed the biggest danger to US security. Rumsfeld noted that Baghdad had “better targets” than Kabul. Powell, pointing to the lack of evidence and the risk of alienating US allies, managed to convince the president to place an invasion of Iraq — at least for the time being — on the back burner.

Encouraged by the swift military victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2001, the hawks made a concerted effort to rally the Administration behind military action against Iraq. According to Richard Haas, the former head of policy planning in the State Department, the final decision in favour of war against Iraq was taken in late spring of 2002. The debate within the Bush Administration then shifted from the question of whether Saddam should be disarmed militarily to the question whether this required a Security Council mandate or not.

While the hawks argued in favour of unilateral action, a more multilateralist camp, preferring to take the issue to the Security Council, emerged around Powell and Armitage. They insisted that a war against Iraq posed such a challenge and harboured such great risks that unilateral military action was simply not feasible. The United States needed coalition partners and to get these it needed to involve the Security Council. In early August, during a private conversation, Powell assured President Bush that he was confident that he could rally most countries — notably including France — behind a war against Iraq.

After months of debate within the Administration the arguments put forward by the “Powell camp” prevailed and President Bush, on 12 September 2002, gave a major speech to the UN General Assembly, in which he announced the United States' willingness to “work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge”.

Why did the United States, sometimes dubbed the Council's “Permanent One” (P1), finally decide to take the issue to the United Nations? Two explanations suggest themselves. The first and most widely accepted view is that the United States accepted that its allies in Europe and the Middle East were less likely to support action against Iraq that did not come with the blessing of the United Nations. This support was less important militarily than it was in political and economical terms. The United States was always unlikely to seek anything beyond symbolic cooperation in the event of conflict, but support would have allowed the United States to defray much of the expense of the conflict onto its allies (as it did in the 1991 Gulf War). This applied a fortiori to post-conflict rebuilding.

International political support was linked to the second explanation, more closely connected to the domestic situation in the United States. Opinion polls have consistently shown that multilateral action is viewed more favourably than unilateral action by a significant majority of Americans, though there is a clear tension within the Administration as to whether the complications of seeking a UN blessing are worth the benefits. What appeared to happen in late August 2002 was that Colin Powell persuaded his colleagues that there was little to lose by engaging the Security Council, which would increase the pressure on Iraq without necessarily binding the United States to a cumbersome procedure. The fact that in mid-August a number of senior members of the Republican foreign policy establishment warned publicly of the dangers of unilateral action might have tipped the balance in favour of doing a detour over New York en route to Baghdad.

The multilateral route initially seemed to pay off for the Bush Administration. After strenuous negotiations in the Council and diplomatic pressure exerted by Washington particularly on the elected members (E-10), the Council on November 8th 2002 unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which afforded Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” and that resulted in the return of the weapons inspectors to Iraq. In the ensuing months, however, the discord within the Council over the passage of the now famous “second resolution” reached unprecedented heights. For some Council members, notably France, Russia, and Germany, the issue of Iraq had already become an issue of larger nature. One official was quoted as saying that “the members [of the Security Council] ended up feeling that they had to stand up to American unilateralism.”

In the end, the collapse of the negotiations in the Council strengthened the position within the Bush Administration of those who had seen the Council as “a quagmire to be skirted, not a legitimizing body to be courted.” This also had important consequences for a potential role for the UN during or after the war.

Prior to the war, discussion within the United States tended to focus on a political function for the United Nations only when considering the question of how the occupation might be paid for. Two discrete post-conflict scenarios for Iraq were in the public domain before the March invasion. The first was broadly consistent with the plans leaked by the Pentagon in October 2002 for an American-led military government in Iraq modelled on the US occupation of Japan, with the United Nations providing humanitarian assistance. The second scenario, advanced by Britain and, to a lesser extent, by the US State Department, included a larger — if essentially undefined — role for the United Nations. The latter position was implicit in the Azores Declaration issued by the leaders of Britain, Spain, and the United States days before the outbreak of hostilities, but was subsequently downplayed by the Bush Administration.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2003, the Departments of State and Defense affirmed that the United States — rather than the United Nations or some provisional government of Iraqi exiles — would take charge in Baghdad. Civilian tasks would be carried out under the authority of the Pentagon's new Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), established by Bush on 20 January 2003. ORHA's director, retired Army Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, would report to the President through General Tommy Franks of Central Command and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

As the war began, US, British, and UN officials were exploring the possibility of transforming Iraq's Oil-for-Food programme, established by the Security Council in April 1995, into a more flexible arrangement to allow the United Nations to control goods purchased under its auspices throughout the country. Suggestions that oil revenues might actually cover military expenses incurred by the United States in defeating and administering Iraq were confined to the most radical US think tanks. Bringing the post-conflict phase of operations under UN auspices had other financial attractions. Most prominently, Chris Patten, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, had stated before the war that if the United States attacked Iraq without Security Council approval the European Union might withhold money for reconstruction.

For its part, the UN Secretariat was reluctant to get engaged in considerations of post-conflict scenarios for Iraq. An early planning cell was shut down in December 2002 due to concerns that its very existence might be interpreted as undermining the position of UN weapons inspectors then in Iraq. A confidential internal “pre-planning” report was requested in February 2003 and promptly leaked to the press. The report stressed that the United Nations lacked the capacity to take on the responsibility of administering Iraq, preferring a political process similar to that followed in Afghanistan. The favoured option — in the context of what was, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan later emphasized, only preliminary thinking — called for an assistance mission that would provide political facilitation, consensus-building, national reconciliation, and the promotion of democratic governance and the rule of law. The people of Iraq, rather than the international community, should determine national government structures, a legal framework, and governance arrangements.

There was, of course, a certain irony to this controversy about planning. The United Nations is rightly criticized when, as in East Timor in 1999, it fails to plan for a scenario (widespread violence after a vote to separate from Indonesia) that many saw as a probable outcome of the popular consultation being conducted by the UN with security guaranteed by the Indonesian military. In Iraq, the United Nations was criticized for engaging in preliminary thinking on an eventuality that most regarded as inevitable. But the tension within the planning process also reflected concerns about a role that might be thrust upon the United Nations in order to provide political cover for what was to become a US military occupation.

Regime Change

The US decision to go to war with Iraq on 20 March 2003 without a Security Council resolution dealt a heavy blow to the Council and to the international system based on international law in general. President Bush and numerous pundits accused the Council — and the UN system at large — of failing to live up to its responsibility and predicted the world body's irrelevance. The day after the bombing campaign had commenced, Richard Perle hailed the “death” of the UN and posited that sufficient legitimacy for the invasion was in fact conferred by a “willing coalition of liberal democracies.”

But many experts and diplomats within and outside of the UN, though troubled by the diplomatic porcelain destroyed in the run-up to the war, judged the diplomatic fall-out and its consequences differently. According to Michael W. Doyle, for instance,

The Council's performance on Iraq in March 2003 was both — and in about equal measure — a massive disappointment and a surprising relief. It disappointed all hopes that this essential international forum for multilateral policy could achieve a viable common policy. At the same time, it demonstrated to the surprise of many that it would not let itself be bullied or bribed by any power, permanent or even hyper.

The run up to the war had not only created deep divides among the members of the Security Council. Serious tensions also arose within the UN Secretariat. During the period now referred to as “major combat operations” in Iraq, a sharp division of views had emerged within the Secretariat concerning what Secretary-General Kofi Annan should say about the war. Some held that he should come out strongly against the use of force by the United States in a manner that he had earlier warned “would not be in conformity with the [UN] Charter”. Others argued that the Secretary-General should support the aims of the conflict, putting himself and the United Nations in a position where he might retain some influence over the outcome. In what was, in the end, a minority position, Annan chose to say very little. Though easily caricatured as weakness, this position sought to preserve the one thing that the UN might have realistically brought to the post-conflict phase: a measure of impartiality. It also recognized that the greatest leverage that the UN has in such situations is just before it commits to a course of action; once the UN is committed, its limited political capital is largely spent.

On the military front, the outcome of the conflict was never in serious doubt, but the manner in which the war was fought served as a proxy for debates within the United States on the size and posture of its armed forces. The swift victory demonstrated a paradox of the “revolution in military affairs” propounded by Donald Rumsfeld: a smaller, faster, more lethal US military might be able to achieve quick victories over anyone that stood against it, but, as Rumsfeld understated it, the aftermath of such wars can be most “untidy”. It soon became apparent that little serious planning had been done on stabilizing the post-conflict situation, reflecting a reliance upon best-case scenarios in which a minimal US presence could draw heavily upon the pre-existing Iraqi bureaucracy and security sector. Within the Department of Defense, it subsequently emerged, best-case scenario planning was due in part to pressure on the various intelligence services to produce assessments favourable to the war plan, and in part to the enormous influence accorded to head of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmad Chalabi.

Jay Garner's tenure as administrator of Iraq was a debacle, plagued by inexperience, bureaucratic infighting, and inertia. In less than a month he was replaced by L. Paul Bremer III. But there is a widespread misperception that a greater role for the United Nations would have avoided some or all of the difficulties experienced by the United States in post-conflict Iraq. Certainly, three of the most egregious errors in Iraq — failing to provide for emergency law and order, disbanding the Iraqi army, and blanket de-Baathification — ran counter to lessons from previous operations. But the greatest mistake by US planners may have been the assumption that previous UN nation-building efforts have achieved mixed successes because of UN incompetence, rather than due to the inherent contradictions in building democracy through foreign military intervention.

Rapprochement?

When President Bush stood aboard the aircraft carrier Lincoln under a barrier reading “mission accomplished” on 1 May 2003 and declared the end of major combat operations, few would have predicted the volte-face that Washington was soon to undertake vis-à-vis the UN's role in Iraq's transition. The United States and its allies had won a quick and decisive military victory, avoiding a bloody battle over Baghdad and suffering very few allied casualties.

During the hostilities, the Security Council was effectively sidelined by the US and British governments. With the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the rise in coordination and lethality of insurgents from around mid-2003, however, the Council became increasingly important to the Bush Administration. Wary of the strains of the occupation on its military, the Bush Administration soon reached out to other states to supply forces to Iraq in an effort to share the burden of the costly military occupation. The dilemma for the Bush Administration was that this would require giving up some measure of political control over events in Iraq. When the US was seeking troops and funds to support the reconstruction process, linkage to UN involvement in the political process was one of the bargaining chips invoked by potential troop contributors such as India. The focus of attention thus once again shifted to the Council and its member states.

Within the Administration, the State Department again gained the upper hand. Powell, still suffering from the humiliation he suffered in the Security Council, had stated soon after hostilities commenced that a “UN role might help lend legitimacy to a post-war Iraq occupation and reduce hostility toward it in the region and around the world.” The degree of UN involvement in post-war Iraq remained unclear. In late March, President Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice, told Kofi Annan that the Administration was eager for the UN to play a role in Iraq, but it would be limited to humanitarian issues.

Security Council resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003, was an uncomfortable compromise on these questions. The resolution explicitly recognized that the United States together with Britain — as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) — were occupying powers in Iraq and called on them to comply with their obligations under the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The resolution also called upon the Authority “to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future”.

The resolution also highlighted a tension in the law governing military occupation. The Hague and Geneva provisions allow an occupying power to exercise temporary authority over territory that comes under its control. The occupying power is entitled to ensure the security of its forces, but is also required to “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” In addition to other positive obligations, such as ensuring public health and sanitation, as well as the provision of food and medical supplies, however, the occupying power is prohibited from changing local laws except as necessary for its own security and is limited in its capacity to change state institutions. As “Operation Iraqi Freedom” was intended precisely to change Iraq's laws and institutions, further legal authority was required.

The importance that Kofi Annan attached to the reconstruction of Iraq was highlighted by the fact that he appointed one of his most trusted and experienced diplomat, Sergio Vieira de Mello, as Special Representative for Iraq and head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which had been mandated by the Security Council through Resolution 1483. Vieira de Mello, previously Special Representative in both Kosovo and East Timor, also enjoyed tacit approval from Washington. Despite the limitations of his mandate, Vieira de Mello made important contributions to the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), from its very name to its expansion from a hand-picked half-dozen Iraqis to a broadly representative group of 25. Beyond this, however, he was effectively marginalized from the CPA's activities — in the Secretary-General's words, the IGC and CPA “expressed less enthusiasm for United Nations involvement” in areas other than human rights and electoral assistance.

For the UN Secretariat and Kofi Annan, the main problem with Resolution 1483 was that the responsibilities given to the UN were ambiguous. Though the UN's role was repeatedly said to be “vital”, the powers given to the Special Representative were intentionally vague: these included “coordinating”, “reporting”, “assisting”, “promoting”, “facilitating”, and “encouraging” various aspects of humanitarian relief and reconstruction. On the fundamental question of political structures, the Special Representative was empowered to work “intensively with the [Coalition Provisional] Authority, the people of Iraq, and others concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq”. In the meantime, the Security Council supported the formation “by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority and working with the Special Representative” of an interim administration “run by Iraqis”. Senior Defense Department officials described their relationship with the United Nations as “input but no veto”.

The 19 August 2003 attack on the UN compound, which killed 22 people including Vieira de Mello, was a crucial if tragic turning point in US-UN relations. In addition to prompting an effective evacuation of international staff from most of Iraq, the bombing strengthened latent hostility within the UN towards the US for forcing the organization into Iraq in the first place. It also drove the Secretary-General, who found himself under pressure for the security failures in the UN's Baghdad compound, to unusually assertive statements about what the UN would and would not do in the future. At the same time, the attack on the UN compound also underscored that the image of the United Nations as an impartial actor in Iraq had been compromised. In fact, it also demonstrated to many that the UN had in Iraq for a long time been regarded as less than neutral, not only because of its role in authorizing the Gulf War but also the highly intrusive and painful sanctions regime. The core dilemma for the Secretary-General was thus the need for the UN to distinguish clearly its role in the reconstruction process from that of the occupying powers. Far from being irrelevant to the designs of Washington, the UN now proved infuriatingly “hard to get” under a newly assertive Secretary-General.

This period also required delicate diplomacy from the Bush Administration, under increasing pressure domestically and internationally for the lack of evidence of any Iraqi WMDs. Voices in the corridors of the UN demanding a mea culpa from President Bush grew louder. President Bush's speech at the General Assembly in September 2003 was thus highly anticipated. Mark Malloch Brown, the Administrator of the UN Development Programme, stated that “I don't think that anybody's in the mood to have the US taught an international civics lesson by withholding support. … It is in nobody's interest to have a further deterioration in Iraq. … But on the other hand, I think many members feel that their warnings before the war were quite prophetic. They expect to be asked properly.”

Secretary-General Kofi Annan understood this increased leverage on the part of the UN when he criticized a draft Security Council resolution be

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Source	org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode
Exception	org.apache.cocoon.ProcessingException
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extra info
Original exception : org.apache.cocoon.ResourceNotFoundException: Resource not found file:/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.startElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:158) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.parse(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:134) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.deserialize(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:110) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:219) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingStreamPipeline.process(CachingStreamPipeline.java:395) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.SerializeNode.invoke(SerializeNode.java:154) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.MountNode.invoke(MountNode.java:124) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.Cocoon.process(Cocoon.java:579) at org.apache.cocoon.servlet.CocoonServlet.service(CocoonServlet.java:1043) at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:802) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:252) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:173) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:214) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:178) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:126) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:105) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:107) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:148) at org.apache.jk.server.JkCoyoteHandler.invoke(JkCoyoteHandler.java:306) at org.apache.jk.common.HandlerRequest.invoke(HandlerRequest.java:385) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.invoke(ChannelSocket.java:745) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.processConnection(ChannelSocket.java:675) at org.apache.jk.common.SocketConnection.runIt(ChannelSocket.java:868) at org.apache.tomcat.util.threads.ThreadPool$ControlRunnable.run(ThreadPool.java:684) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:595) Original exception : org.apache.cocoon.ResourceNotFoundException: Resource not found file:/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.FileSource.getInputStream(FileSource.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.AbstractStreamSource.getInputSource(AbstractStreamSource.java:161) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.processXIncludeElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:296) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.startElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:155) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.parse(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:134) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.deserialize(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:110) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:219) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingStreamPipeline.process(CachingStreamPipeline.java:395) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.SerializeNode.invoke(SerializeNode.java:154) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.MountNode.invoke(MountNode.java:124) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.Cocoon.process(Cocoon.java:579) at org.apache.cocoon.servlet.CocoonServlet.service(CocoonServlet.java:1043) at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:802) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:252) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:173) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:214) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:178) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:126) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:105) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:107) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:148) at org.apache.jk.server.JkCoyoteHandler.invoke(JkCoyoteHandler.java:306) at org.apache.jk.common.HandlerRequest.invoke(HandlerRequest.java:385) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.invoke(ChannelSocket.java:745) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.processConnection(ChannelSocket.java:675) at org.apache.jk.common.SocketConnection.runIt(ChannelSocket.java:868) at org.apache.tomcat.util.threads.ThreadPool$ControlRunnable.run(ThreadPool.java:684) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:595) Caused by: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at java.io.FileInputStream.open(Native Method) at java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(FileInputStream.java:106) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.FileSource.getInputStream(FileSource.java:143) ... 43 more java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at java.io.FileInputStream.open(Native Method) at java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(FileInputStream.java:106) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.FileSource.getInputStream(FileSource.java:143) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.AbstractStreamSource.getInputSource(AbstractStreamSource.java:161) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.processXIncludeElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:296) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.startElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:155) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.parse(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:134) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.deserialize(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:110) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:219) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingStreamPipeline.process(CachingStreamPipeline.java:395) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.SerializeNode.invoke(SerializeNode.java:154) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.MountNode.invoke(MountNode.java:124) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.Cocoon.process(Cocoon.java:579) at org.apache.cocoon.servlet.CocoonServlet.service(CocoonServlet.java:1043) at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:802) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:252) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:173) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:214) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:178) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:126) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:105) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:107) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:148) at org.apache.jk.server.JkCoyoteHandler.invoke(JkCoyoteHandler.java:306) at org.apache.jk.common.HandlerRequest.invoke(HandlerRequest.java:385) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.invoke(ChannelSocket.java:745) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.processConnection(ChannelSocket.java:675) at org.apache.jk.common.SocketConnection.runIt(ChannelSocket.java:868) at org.apache.tomcat.util.threads.ThreadPool$ControlRunnable.run(ThreadPool.java:684) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:595) Original exception : java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at java.io.FileInputStream.open(Native Method) at java.io.FileInputStream.<init>(FileInputStream.java:106) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.FileSource.getInputStream(FileSource.java:143) at org.apache.cocoon.components.source.AbstractStreamSource.getInputSource(AbstractStreamSource.java:161) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.processXIncludeElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:296) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.startElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:155) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.parse(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:134) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.deserialize(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:110) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:219) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingStreamPipeline.process(CachingStreamPipeline.java:395) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.SerializeNode.invoke(SerializeNode.java:154) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.MountNode.invoke(MountNode.java:124) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.Cocoon.process(Cocoon.java:579) at org.apache.cocoon.servlet.CocoonServlet.service(CocoonServlet.java:1043) at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:802) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:252) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:173) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:214) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:178) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:126) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:105) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:107) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:148) at org.apache.jk.server.JkCoyoteHandler.invoke(JkCoyoteHandler.java:306) at org.apache.jk.common.HandlerRequest.invoke(HandlerRequest.java:385) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.invoke(ChannelSocket.java:745) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.processConnection(ChannelSocket.java:675) at org.apache.jk.common.SocketConnection.runIt(ChannelSocket.java:868) at org.apache.tomcat.util.threads.ThreadPool$ControlRunnable.run(ThreadPool.java:684) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:595)
java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory)
org.apache.cocoon.ProcessingException: Failed to execute pipeline.: org.apache.cocoon.ResourceNotFoundException: Resource not found file:/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:223) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingStreamPipeline.process(CachingStreamPipeline.java:395) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.SerializeNode.invoke(SerializeNode.java:154) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.MountNode.invoke(MountNode.java:124) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.Cocoon.process(Cocoon.java:579) at org.apache.cocoon.servlet.CocoonServlet.service(CocoonServlet.java:1043) at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:802) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:252) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:173) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:214) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:178) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:126) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:105) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:107) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:148) at org.apache.jk.server.JkCoyoteHandler.invoke(JkCoyoteHandler.java:306) at org.apache.jk.common.HandlerRequest.invoke(HandlerRequest.java:385) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.invoke(ChannelSocket.java:745) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.processConnection(ChannelSocket.java:675) at org.apache.jk.common.SocketConnection.runIt(ChannelSocket.java:868) at org.apache.tomcat.util.threads.ThreadPool$ControlRunnable.run(ThreadPool.java:684) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:595) Caused by: org.apache.cocoon.ResourceNotFoundException: Resource not found file:/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.startElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:158) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.parse(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:134) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.deserialize(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:110) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:219) ... 37 more org.apache.cocoon.ResourceNotFoundException: Resource not found file:/usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385: java.io.FileNotFoundException: /usr/local/tomcat/webapps/sdx/lbq/http:/www.revue-lebanquet.com/hits.xsp2sdxX?id=o_0000385 (No such file or directory) at org.apache.cocoon.transformation.XIncludeTransformer.startElement(XIncludeTransformer.java:158) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.parse(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:134) at org.apache.cocoon.components.sax.XMLByteStreamInterpreter.deserialize(XMLByteStreamInterpreter.java:110) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingEventPipeline.process(CachingEventPipeline.java:219) at org.apache.cocoon.components.pipeline.CachingStreamPipeline.process(CachingStreamPipeline.java:395) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.SerializeNode.invoke(SerializeNode.java:154) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.MountNode.invoke(MountNode.java:124) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:85) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PreparableMatchNode.invoke(PreparableMatchNode.java:166) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelineNode.invoke(PipelineNode.java:151) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.AbstractParentProcessingNode.invokeNodes(AbstractParentProcessingNode.java:109) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.sitemap.PipelinesNode.invoke(PipelinesNode.java:145) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:332) at org.apache.cocoon.components.treeprocessor.TreeProcessor.process(TreeProcessor.java:293) at org.apache.cocoon.Cocoon.process(Cocoon.java:579) at org.apache.cocoon.servlet.CocoonServlet.service(CocoonServlet.java:1043) at javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:802) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.internalDoFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:252) at org.apache.catalina.core.ApplicationFilterChain.doFilter(ApplicationFilterChain.java:173) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardWrapperValve.invoke(StandardWrapperValve.java:214) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardContextValve.invoke(StandardContextValve.java:178) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardHostValve.invoke(StandardHostValve.java:126) at org.apache.catalina.valves.ErrorReportValve.invoke(ErrorReportValve.java:105) at org.apache.catalina.core.StandardEngineValve.invoke(StandardEngineValve.java:107) at org.apache.catalina.connector.CoyoteAdapter.service(CoyoteAdapter.java:148) at org.apache.jk.server.JkCoyoteHandler.invoke(JkCoyoteHandler.java:306) at org.apache.jk.common.HandlerRequest.invoke(HandlerRequest.java:385) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.invoke(ChannelSocket.java:745) at org.apache.jk.common.ChannelSocket.processConnection(ChannelSocket.java:675) at org.apache.jk.common.SocketConnection.runIt(ChannelSocket.java:868) at org.apache.tomcat.util.threads.ThreadPool$ControlRunnable.run(ThreadPool.java:684) at java.lang.Thread.run(Thread.java:595)