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Le Banquet,
n°21,
2004/2.
Domaine international -
thème États-Unis.
Par Fraser Cameron
Despite the fact that the transatlantic relationship is the most important and complete relationship in the world, never have
Europeans held such a low opinion of America as today. Not even during the dark days of Vietnam or the Star Wars ambitions
of Ronald Reagan has the US been so reviled by so many Europeans. There are two short-term related reasons for this alarming
slump in American popularity in Europe - President George W Bush and the US-led invasion of Iraq. In summer 2004, less than
one in five Europeans has a favourable view of the US president and over 75% think the war in Iraq was a mistake. The horrendous
pictures of American soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners have further worsened America's already poor image in Europe. But
there are also more fundamental and long-term political, economic and social trends developing that affect the transatlantic
relationship, allegedly based on common values and interests.
What is Europe? For the purpose of this essay Europe is defined as the 25 member states of the European Union (EU). One of
the fears in France and elsewhere is whether the new member states that joined the Union on 1 May 2004 will be American “Trojan
horses”. It is argued later that this fear is exaggerated. This article considers the views of most member states towards
America as well as the attitudes of EU officials dealing with the US.
What is America? For most Europeans, America is synonymous with the United States. That everyone understands the word America
to refer to the USA is testimony to the power of the brand that America projects through its foreign policy, military power,
intelligence capabilities, business corporations, universities, cultural outlets, media and NGOs. America, in its actions
and effect on other people around the world, forms a complex whole. But there are at least two Americas, one with much closer
affinity to European values than the other. A glance at the electoral map of the US reveals a country sharply divided between
the democrats and republicans. The democrats are well established on both coasts, in New England and parts of the mid West.
The republicans are now the dominant party of the South, the Southwest and the Mountain states. Elections are won and lost
in just a few swing states such as Florida, Ohio, Michigan. The democrat controlled states are generally liberal, pro-abortion,
anti-gun, pro-environment, internationalist and secular. The republican areas are generally conservative, anti-abortion, pro-gun,
anti-environment, nationalist and religious. In many countries these fundamental differences would lead to perennial conflict
but because America is such a vast country these two very different societies co-exist uneasily with one another.
Public Opinion
According to a series of opinion polls up to summer 2004, the image of the US among Europeans has never been worse For many
years the Pew surveys (Pew Global Attitudes project) and the German Marshall Fund have tracked European attitudes towards
the US. An analysis of their combined results reveals that the vast majority of European (78%) have an unfavourable view of
the Bush administration and its foreign policy. The results, taken before publication of the pictures inside the Abu Ghraib
jail in Iraq, reveal an even sharper fall in support for the US in European countries that sent troops to Iraq. Even in Britain
and Poland there are clear majorities opposed to Bush's foreign policy. It is important to distinguish between attitudes towards
the Bush administration and America as such. There remains a strong regard for America as a nation (57%) but little support
for the present administration (23%) This varies from country to country but in France, for example, 53% of French have a
favourable view of Americans, yet only 24% support the Bush administration. The figures for Germany are 55% and 26% and in
the UK only slightly more favourable at 61% and 28%.
There are substantial majorities in all European countries (73% average) who believe that the US lied about its motives for
the Iraq war and similar high majorities (68%) consider the US is over-reacting to the threat of terrorism. This has led to
a sharp drop (51% compared to 68% in 2003) in those who believe that US world leadership is a good thing.
The polls also reveal many similarities in public attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic, especially on the desirability
of working through multilateral institutions. While 77% of Europeans prefer the UN as the first focus of any international
crisis, only slightly fewer (68%) Americans share the view. The main differences in public attitudes across the Atlantic relate
to pre-emptive strikes and readiness to use military power and support for Israel. While 68% of Americans accept the need
for pre-emptive strikes to deal with security threats only 44% of Europeans agree. On the Arab-Israeli dispute, a majority
of Americans (74%) blame the Palestinians for the conflict while almost the same number of Europeans (71%) blame the Israelis.
What Divides Europe and America?
From the end of World War II until the fall of the Berlin Wall America and Europe appeared to grow increasingly similar as
American culture dominated Europe and the transatlantic economic relationship steadily grew in importance. The EU and US are
each other's biggest suppliers, consumers and investors. Over one billion euros of goods and services is traded each day across
the Atlantic. A stream of political declarations and speeches has reiterated the mantra of Europe and America sharing the
same values but there is considerable evidence that the two blocs are moving apart on many political, social and economic
issues.
These differences cover many areas ranging from the importance of money in US election campaigns to the lack of welfare provisions
in America. For most Europeans the amount of money spent on elections is obscene. Equally, many Europeans find the lack of
health and social security cover for millions of Americans unacceptable. Another divisive issue is America's continuing use
of the death penalty, despite continual European pressure to end this form of punishment. There are very different attitudes
towards gun control, towards sustainable development and the environment, towards genetically modified foods, and perhaps
most important, religion. Europe is largely secular while the influence of religion on the American political system remains
disturbingly high to many Europeans. In addition there is considerable fear in Europe that Europeans may be dragged in to
fight American wars around the world. Although political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic talk of shared values one must
question this in light of the above and other issues such as respect for international law. Europeans have been shocked at
the treatment of “illegal combatants” in Guantanamo.
For some, mainly on the Left in Europe, anti-Americanism is essentially a matter of ideology. American capitalism, military
power and self-reliance are shunned. For others, anti-Americanism is a French plot to promote Europe at the expense of the
US. There is thus much mutual schizophrenia and not a little paranoia, sometimes mixed with jealousy, on both sides of the
Atlantic.
At the same time, there are many Americans and American institutions Europeans admire. Michael Moore's films (Fahrenheit 9/11, Bowling for Colombine) and books (Stupid White Men) are highly popular in Europe. Europeans flock to see Hollywood's latest films, listen to Madonna and Britney Spears, and
watch ‘Friends' and ‘ER' on television. Europeans use Microsoft, drink Coke and drive Fords like their American counterparts. Europe's brightest and
best are often lured to Harvard and Stanford by high salaries and unrivalled research facilities.
The present anti-American feeling in Europe is thus different from ‘the Ugly American' image of the 1970s and 1980s. It is
different in two important respects. First, it is largely focussed on the narrow group of neo-cons within the Bush administration.
Second, it includes representatives from the elites in countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain, countries that were traditionally
pro-American.
A Little History
Historically Europe and America are more closely connected than any other continents. Modern America was populated by Europeans,
a majority of whom were seeking refuge from tyranny and poverty in Europe. In the nineteenth century waves of Irish, Italians,
Poles and other European emigrants enriched the melting pot that became today's America. For them, America was the promised
land and for the most part they turned their back on the old continent. Europeans thus made a huge contribution to the development
of America. In more recent times European immigration has dwindled and Asian and Hispanic immigrants have been the main source
of population growth in the US. These ethnic groups have correspondingly increased their political influence at the expense
of the various European diasporas. American presidential candidates have to woo the black vote, the Hispanic vote, the Asian
vote, the Jewish vote, but not the European vote.
Twice in the twentieth century America came to the rescue of Europeans embroiled in highly destructive civil wars. After the
first intervention the US retreated into isolationism. After the second intervention the US helped create the multilateral
system that we know today - the United Nations, the IMF and World Bank and the GATT, forerunner of the WTO. The US also provided
Europe with a security guarantee through NATO and was generous in its provision of economic assistance via the Marshall Plan.
During the Cold War most Europeans were grateful for the American presence on their continent. Sure there was the odd trade
dispute (chicken wars) and some major political clashes (Suez) but the Soviet threat provided the glue that held the transatlantic
alliance together. It was America's involvement in Vietnam that started the decline in the hitherto positive image the US
had in Europe. While John F Kennedy enjoyed cult status in Europe, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon aroused more hostility
than enthusiasm. Although Henry Kissinger declared 1973 to be the “year of Europe” European views of America continued to
decline, partly because of fresh disputes over Germany's Ostpolitik, the stationing of Pershing missiles in Europe and Reagan's
Star Wars. America's penchant for military interventions around the world also found little support in Europe.
With the end of the Cold War George Bush senior regarded Europe as an important factor in his new world order. In 1990 a transatlantic
partnership was agreed that provided for regular political consultations. Most European leaders wanted Bush senior to win
the 1992 elections rather than the unknown Governor from Arkansas. The first few years of the Clinton presidency were poisoned
by disputes over the break-up of Yugoslavia. But in 1995 the US intervened to bring a temporary end to the bloody conflict
and in the same year the EU and US agreed on a New Transatlantic Agenda that provided for regular consultation and cooperation
on global, regional and economic issues, and aimed to foster ‘people to people' contacts. Partly because of his personal charm
and sympathy for his troubles with Congress, Clinton enjoyed a high reputation in Europe, a continent in which he had studied
and travelled, and with which he seemed to have a special rapport. Ironically his impeachment following his affair with an
intern, Monika Levinsky, probably did more to increase his popularity in Europe.
George W Bush
Taking office in January 2000, George W Bush was a different story. He had rarely visited Europe and enjoyed a poor reputation
in Europe as governor of Texas for his alleged dismal record on the environment (“the Toxic Texan”) and propensity to use
the death penalty for convicted felons. Most European intellectuals and most of the media were solidly behind Gore, a fact
that did not go unnoticed and which was not forgotten in the Bush camp. The farcical circumstances surrounding Bush's election
victory, especially in Florida where his brother was Governor, aroused widespread derision in Europe.
If George W Bush had a master plan to upset Europeans in his first nine months in office he could not have been more successful.
He had hardly entered the White House before he rejected many treaties of fundamental interest to Europeans. Indeed he seemed
to take delight in stating categorically that the Kyoto protocol was dead, that the US would never sign up for the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and that arms control treaties were not for the world's sole superpower. His senior advisors, Cheney,
Rice, Powell and Rumsfeld, knew almost nothing about the European Union and seemed uninterested in Europe's drive for closer
integration. The administration also seemed to take delight in rejecting everything that Bill Clinton had tried to do in foreign
policy. There were to be no more negotiations on the Arab-Israeli dispute, or with North Korea.
This feeling of hubris, thanks mainly to America's astonishing military superiority over other nations, affects thinking across
the political spectrum in America. But to the neo-cons taking office in 2001 it was an opportunity to demonstrate a new type
of American leadership. Given America's military might there was only one sensible approach for the US. America must lead
and others must follow. There was no need for alliances or consultations. At best there could be coalitions of the willing
ready to accept American policy, without question. America's swift defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan reinforced the belief
in military power as an all-encompassing tool. The neo-cons were convinced that American power could defeat Iraq, then Iran,
Syria and North Korea.
Most European leaders were perplexed at this new approach to leadership. Previous US presidents had sometimes gone it alone
when the occasion demanded, but on major issues, such as the first Gulf War, the US had been at pains to consult its major
allies. Now the message was crystal clear. America leads – others should follow.
The Impact of 9/11
It was against this background that America suffered the traumatic shock of 9/11. There was genuine sympathy across Europe
symbolised by the Le Monde headline “We are all Americans Now”. Europeans largely agreed with the initial measured response of the US towards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Al
Qaeda. They were dismayed, however, that the US rejected the instant offer of NATO to invoke article V, the automatic defence
guarantee. The Pentagon let it be know that as a result of the Kosovo experience there was to be no more war by committee.
Now the mission decided the coalition not the coalition the mission - and NATO was not required. Europeans thought that the
shock of 9/11 would propel the US back towards the multilateral track. After all this was exactly what George Bush senior
had argued in an interview with the Boston Globe just three days after 9/11. But Bush junior was determined to use American power in an untrammelled manner to win the “war
on terror”.
Even this phrase was rejected by Europeans. Javier Solana spoke for the old continent when he said that the world faced a
“fight against terrorism”, not a war on terror, as such a war could never be won. There was to be further Bush rhetoric that
was unacceptable to Europeans. The president's “axis of evil” speech in January 2002 grated on the ears of Europeans more
than the fact that the president failed to mention either the EU or NATO in his speech but made several references to the
importance the US attached to Israel. Europeans rejected the notion propagated by Bush “you are either with us or against
us”.
During the remainder of 2002 American plans for war against Saddam Hussein began to take shape, a decision that would cause
immense damage to transatlantic relations and the image of America in Europe. It is clear from many sources that the decision
to go to war was taken in the summer of 2002 and that the diplomatic efforts at the UN were a sideshow. The world looked on
with incredulity as Colin Powell attempted to prove in a power point presentation at the UN that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, was engulfed by applause after rejecting the American case. The
stage was set for the tragic Iraq adventure that would do so much damage to transatlantic relations.
Among the charges that Europeans level at the Bush administration concerning the Iraq war are the following. Intelligence
about Iraqi possession of WMD was distorted for political purposes. There was an intoxication caused by hubris and belief
that American military power could achieve anything. Consequently there was almost no sensible planning for a post-Saddam
administration. Europeans and ordinary Iraqis could not understand how a country that could develop such precision munitions
could not manage to re-establish basic services such as electricity and clean water supplies. The first pro-consul sent to
Iraq, General Garner was incompetent. His replacement, Paul Bremer, has no experience of Iraq. The Iraqi exiles that the US
wanted to place in power enjoyed no popular support. There was a massive under-estimation of the likely resistance to what
most Iraqis viewed as an occupation rather than liberation. And finally there was an appalling lack of discipline in the treatment
of Iraqi prisoners, most notably in the Abu Ghraib prison. Far from Bush demanding the head of the man ultimately responsible
for this debacle, Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, the president praised him for doing “a superb job”.
Beyond Iraq
Although Iraq is the single most damaging issue causing the massive drop in support for America in Europe there are other
factors to be considered. Post Cold War America is the only superpower, or ‘hyperpower' as Hubert Vidrine suggested. For the
democrat Madeleine Albright, the US is ‘the indispensable nation' for global order. For the republican Richard Perle, the
US is ‘Rome and Athens combined'. The feeling that military power entitles the US to be treated differently is widespread
in political elites in America.
In addition to major differences over the use and purpose of military power there were also transatlantic disputes over how
to tackle so-called rogue states even if military power was ruled out. Cuba was a classic case of US-EU differences. For forty
years Washington, under the influence of Cuban exiles in Florida, has imposed a strict embargo on Fidel Castro's regime. But
instead of bringing about change it merely provided a rallying call for the embattled Cuban leader. Europeans, and Canadians,
have preferred a policy of critical engagement with Cuba and as a result were hit by American sanctions against their companies.
Reference has already been made to the changing demographics in America. Political power has moved to the south and west,
away from the traditionally pro-European elites of the north-east. If Kerry wins in November he will be the first president
from the region since Kennedy in 1960.
Attitudes of Member States
Most member states of the EU, not just the UK, think that they enjoy a ‘special relationship' with America. The Irish prime
minister has automatic entry to the White House every St Patrick's day. Both Berlusconi and Aznar played up their special
ties to Bush. Each European ambassador in Washington DC is judged by how long an audience he can secure for his head of government
with the US president. This may range from a brief ‘photo op', to a thirty minute meeting, to an hour meeting with lunch,
to a weekend at Camp David, and finally the top accolade, a visit to Crawford, Bush's ranch in Texas.
Britain considers that for reasons of history, shared experience, language and culture it enjoys an inside track with the
US. There is little doubt that it does enjoy considerable access in Washington but there is also little evidence that this
translates into influence. Among post-war British prime ministers only Edward Heath put Europe at the same level as loyalty
to America. Harold Wilson supported Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam, albeit not to the extent of sending British troops. Thatcher
and Reagan enjoyed a close ideological relationship based on antipathy towards communism. John Major and Clinton had a strained
relationship as Major made no secret of his preference for Bush senior to win the 1992 elections. Blair and Clinton were also
ideological soul mates (the third way) and had a close personal relationship. What baffled most observers was Blair's willingness
to have an equally close and uncritical relationship with a right-wing Republican president. His entourage let it be known
that Blair was determined to show that a Labour prime minister could have a good relationship with a Republican president
and act as a bridge between the US and Europe. Whatever the motive, Blair has paid a heavy price for giving the appearance
of being no more than the lap-dog of Washington. His polling ratings have slumped to a record low and he may be fatally wounded
by following Bush into Iraq.
British popular culture follows closely American developments. The British media are also heavily pro-American and anti-European
which is hardly surprising as Rupert Murdoch owns a large part of the media. But there are also strongly dissenting voices
both on the right and left of the spectrum.
France and the US enjoy a love-hate relationship dating back to their shared 18th century revolutions. France has traditionally
adopted a more sceptical approach towards America, despite the fact that it is the only major European state that has never
fought the US. Since President de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated command structure in 1966, Paris has often
been a thorn in the side of America. Unlike the UK or Germany, France has never been afraid to criticise US policy in public.
France has railed against the pernicious impact of Hollywood and the MacDonald culture but accepted Disneyland outside Paris.
France has also rejected the hegemonic tendencies of Washington arguing for a multipolar world in which Europe would be a
counterweight to the US. At the same time, France has always recognised the importance of the US commitment to Europe and
has never urged an American withdrawal from the continent.
Although France bore the brunt of American anger in the run-up to the Iraq war (“cheese eating surrender monkeys”) there was
little damage to the economic relationship. There was a slight fall in American tourists visiting France but two-way investment
has actually increased. By being ready to oppose the US from time to time, France arguably enjoys more respect in Washington
than the UK, which is taken for granted.
There was much popular and genuine sympathy with America following 9/11. President Chirac flew the tricolour at half-mast;
France also pressed for a UN resolution in support of the US; and agreed to invoke article V of the NATO treaty. But like
other European states France expected that the US would return to the multilateralist fold after 9/11 and became increasingly
worried at Washington's determination to opt for a unilateral approach. As the disaster in Iraq unfolded France maintained
a diplomatic silence, content to let its record of opposition to the invasion speak for itself.
Perhaps the most fundamental shift in European attitudes towards America has occurred in Germany. During the Cold War it was
unthinkable for a German Chancellor to criticise Washington. Germany's role was often to try and mediate between Paris and
Washington. But with the end of the Cold War and following German unification, there was a new assertiveness about German
foreign policy and a willingness to challenge conventions. One of the first changes in German policy, approved wholeheartedly
by the US, was a readiness to send German troops abroad into combat operations. Gerhard Schroeder's election in 1998 marked
a new generation taking over the reins of power, one which did not automatically look to Washington for guidance and approval.
Indeed, to the consternation and anger of President Bush, Schroeder fought and won the 2002 election partly on an anti-US
platform, pledging that Germany would never participate in any invasion of Iraq. Schroeder tapped into a rich vein of distrust
about America, fuelled by arrogant US behaviour over several issues ranging from the environment to the security perimeter
of its embassy in Berlin. Even the CDU opposition found it opportune not to identify themselves too closely with Bush. The
Green foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, won plaudits when he confronted Donald Rumsfeld at a conference in Munich in February
2003, stating that as Rumsfeld had not convinced him on WMD in Iraq how could he convince the German people?
In Italy, another traditional pro-American country, there has also been a dramatic deterioration in attitudes towards the
US despite the close personal relationship between Berlusconi and Bush. America had often intervened in Italian politics to
support the Christian Democrats against the Communist Party. This had been largely tolerated by many Italians but Iraq has
changed attitudes. Over 80% of Italians were opposed to the US-led war and Italian participation in the war.
America has also seen its image slip across Europe including Scandinavia.. Norway has traditionally been a faithful ally while
Sweden and Finland have tended to distance themselves from US policy. But in all three countries there are hardly any politicians
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